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Abstract 
Bayesian models of legal arguments generally aim to produce a single integrated model, 
combining each of the legal arguments under consideration. This combined approach 
implicitly assumes that variables and their relationships can be represented without any 
contradiction or misalignment, and in a way that makes sense with respect to the 
competing argument narratives. This paper describes a novel approach to compare and 
‘average’ Bayesian models of legal arguments that have been built independently and 
with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, causal assumptions or 
parameterization. The approach involves assessing whether competing models of legal 
arguments are explained or predict facts uncovered before or during the trial process. 
Those models that are more heavily disconfirmed by the facts are given lower weight, 
as model plausibility measures, in the Bayesian model comparison and averaging 
framework adopted. In this way a plurality of arguments is allowed yet a single 
judgement based on all arguments is possible and rational.  
1. Introduction 
Typically, Bayesian models of legal arguments have been developed with the aim of producing an 
integrated model which combines each of the legal arguments under consideration, such as those 
presented by the defence and prosecution in a trial [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. This approach 
implicitly assumes that the resulting integrated model can represent variables and their relationships 
without any contradiction or misalignment and in a way that makes sense with respect to the competing 
argument narratives. We call this approach to legal argumentation the “integrated Bayesian perspective” 
(see [8], for an account of the history and status of this research area). However, the integrated approach 
can be challenging in practice. By seeking to unify disparate arguments in a single consistent model we 
encounter modelling difficulties that are hard to overcome, such as those reported in [9] relating to the 
basic requirement of mutual exclusivity, and the requirement that conditional or causal dependencies 
remain consistent despite competing or contradictory argument narratives. Finally, the integrated 
approach assumes an omniscient fact-finder capable of rationally fusing all relevant information all at 
once when, in practice, the fact-finder is part of an evolving legal process that culminates in a decision.  
Whilst the integrated approach represents a noble ideal for determining the ‘true’ state of the world, we 
can find no practical requirement or legal stipulation to adopt the integrated approach and neither can 
we assume that, for any legal case, there are only ever two competing arguments requiring unification. 
Indeed, each party in a trial process may present more than one argument, each mutually exclusive of 
the other, positing different causal conjectures, assigning different weights to evidence or even ignoring 
some kinds of evidence altogether.   
Indeed, non-Bayesian approaches to legal argumentation have tended to be narrative-based with a focus 
on comparisons between competing stories and explanations with much less emphasis on formal 
integration [2], [3], [4], [9]. Recent work that incorporates scenario-based approaches with Bayesian 
networks has attempted to partly address this problem [10], [11]. Likewise, a convincing attempt at 
integrating narrative and probabilistic perspectives has been presented in [12], with an emphasis on 
modelling more than mere evidence but also considering competing narratives, explanations and 
notions of credibility and resiliency. However, the main weakness in the approach taken in [12] is that 
it fails to offer a convincing and operational means to structure and compare competing narratives.
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More recent work [13], [14] has attempted to connect arguments, probability and scenarios-based 
approaches. 
This paper presents an approach to modelling legal arguments that maintains the separation of each 
legal argument in separate Bayesian network models (described in Section 3). This approach allows 
differences in the variable definitions and causal dependencies that each argument may contain. Thus, 
in principle, defence and prosecution models may contain different variables with radically different 
causal dependencies and dissimilar probability assignments. Additionally, the paper aims to be 
consistent with the hypothetico-deductive method in that more accurate empirical inferences made by 
one legal argument, rather than another competing legal argument, are given more weight. 
The overall objective of the approach proposed is to model legal decision-making from the perspective 
of an observer or fact-finder (such as a judge or jury member) who observes the different arguments 
and facts presented by both sides of a case. Such an observer will formulate prior beliefs about the 
integrity and coherence of the arguments and will then revise their beliefs after they observe witnesses 
present their evidence and defend it under cross-examination. The observer’s subsequent belief in the 
credibility of the witnesses will drive their revised belief in the credibility of the narratives.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes and motivates the underlying ideas and Section 
3 summarises the Bayesian modelling approaches underpinning our framework. Section 4 presents the 
proposed framework. In Section 5 we use an example to show how the framework might be applied as 
a trial develops. Section 6 presents an integrated model and discusses how it compares with the example 
results. Finally, in Section 7 we offer some discussion and then give conclusions in Section 8. 
2.  The underlying idea and its motivation 
The aim of our paper is to compare Bayesian models of legal arguments, even if they have been built 
independently and with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, causal assumptions 
or parameterisation. We consider the situation in a criminal trial, where a suspect has been charged with 
some crime, and where prosecution and defence arguments each can be represented by a Bayesian 
model. Several facts (primary pieces of evidence), such as the results of forensic analysis and witness 
statements, have been established; but the weight, relevance and interpretation of those facts are 
disputed by the two sides. During court hearings, by cross-examination and argument, further evidence 
of secondary nature comes to light which we call source credibility evidence. This source credibility 
evidence may or may not change our judgement of source credibility. How reliable is a witness? What 
kinds of errors can be made when calling on forensic evidence? 
 
We suppose that the Bayesian model produced by each of the two parties allows them to express the 
arguments about both guilt and innocence of the defendant1. Each is a model of the joint probability 
distribution of several random variables: some of which are supposed to have been observed, others of 
which (“hidden variables") have not. The variables in the two models need not be the same since the 
two parties have different pictures of the causality relations between what is observed in the real world 
on the one hand, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the other hand. The model of the 
prosecution should somehow explain the facts by taking the defendant to be guilty, while the model of 
the prosecution is an explanation of the same facts by taking the defendant to be innocent. But the two 
models do not typically assume a priori guilt and innocence respectively. They might even contain the 
same a priori probabilities of guilt. Typically, prosecution and defence will both have arguments 
concerning motive and opportunity, which describe the situation in the real world at times prior to the 
crime, as well as arguments about forensic evidence, which typically bears on actions or events at the 
time of the crime. If the model of the prosecution deals with evidence for (i.e., facts relating to) motive 
and opportunity, then it must admit that absent those facts, innocence must have been a real possibility, 
hence it will implicitly imply a non-zero prior probability of innocence; by prior we mean prior to 
knowledge of the facts. The prosecution model is put forward to show that a posteriori, i.e., given the 
                                               
1 Note that throughout this paper we use argument and model interchangeably, since we propose that each 
argument can be represented by a model. 
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facts, innocence is highly unlikely. Conversely, the defence model is put forward to show that a 
posteriori, thus given the same facts, innocence is quite possible. 
 
Both models are in fact models for the joint probability distribution of guilt/innocence and the facts. 
They each define their own prior for guilt, as well as their own conditional probabilities for the facts 
given guilt or innocence. We consider a third party, the fact-finder, who has to evaluate the arguments 
of the two sides. This could be a judge, or judges' bench, or a jury, or an academic studying historical 
cases to model either actual or ideal behaviour of triers of fact. Whether our framework should be 
considered descriptive or prescriptive is left open. As we said, both models should allow guilt and 
innocence to be expressed within the model, and both models should allow us to express realisation or 
actualisation of certain facts. The various hidden variables in the two models model the causal relations 
between what can be observed in a way which is consistent with our understanding of “how the world 
works”.  
 
An argument that fails to explain any of the facts of the case or any supplementary facts that arise during 
the case should be believed less than an argument that successfully explains all facts. Therefore, 
arguments that do not explain facts should be penalised by the fact-finder. However, unlike in science 
where models are judged by how well they predict facts, here legal arguments are partly and initially 
“fitted” to the facts and thus do not have the status of scientific predictions. Nonetheless, some 
underlying operating conditions are shared between science and law: in a court case an argument is 
tested by cross examining witnesses. This process may reveal new, previously unknown, contradictory 
facts that discredit the sources used in an argument and hence undermine the argument itself. This 
process closely parallels scientific practice and so our view is to judge legal arguments in a scientific 
way based on how well they explain (historical) facts and how well they predict (new) facts revealed 
during the trial. Indeed, it has been cogently argued that the adversarial fact finding process, as practiced 
in England and Wales, shares the same Enlightenment values and methods of enquiry as the empirical 
scientific process [15]. 
 
We propose that the plausibility the fact-finder has in a model should be a function of how well it 
explains the facts of the case and by its ability to anticipate future facts, revealed during the case. We 
propose measuring plausibility as the joint probability that all facts are confirmed by a model. Under 
this framework a model that makes incorrect predictions would suffer penalty and a model that relies 
on too many auxiliary hypotheses and assumptions will be more fragile and easier to refute. There is 
persuasive evidence to support the idea that lay people think this way too [16]. 
 
Contradictions between hypotheses that attempt to explain old facts and new facts are mediated in our 
framework by the credibility the fact-finder places in the sources of those facts. If a source is discredited 
by new facts that contradict older ones, then those elements of the argument that rely on that source will 
be disbelieved. Hence, source credibility and observations (facts) about source credibility play a 
prominent role. Accordingly, the original Bayesian models produced by each party are enhanced by the 
fact-finder such that it reflects their own judgements about these factors. 
3. Bayesian Inference methods applied 
There are two types of Bayesian inference in our framework. The first is Bayesian Model Comparison 
and Averaging (BMCA) and the second are Bayesian Networks (BNs). Bayes Theorem underpins both 
approaches and is a sufficiently good starting point to understand BMCA and BNs. Bayes Theorem 
states that the probability of a hypothesis variable, 𝐻 = ℎ$, with 𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑛 states, given evidence 
variable, 𝐸, is: 𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$	|	𝐸) = 𝑃(𝐸	|	𝐻 = ℎ$)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$)∑ 𝑃(𝐸	|	𝐻 = ℎ$)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$)2$34 	(1) 
where: 𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$	|	𝐸) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis being true; 𝑃(𝐸	|	𝐻 = ℎ$) is the 
likelihood of observing the evidence, 𝐸, given the hypothesis; 𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$)	is the prior probability of the 
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hypothesis being true; and 𝑃(𝐸) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐸	|	𝐻 = ℎ$)𝑃(𝐻 = ℎ$)2$34  is the probability of observing the 
evidence over all hypotheses. 
BMCA is widely used to compare and average predictions, sourced from different models that, despite 
differences in content and accuracy, allow their combination using the same observed data [17], [18]. 
BMCA applies a standard norm of scientific investigation by identifying those models that predict or 
explain the available data, more or less well and weighs each model by the plausibility of their 
performance. Assuming we have several different models, each competing to explain and predict the 
same phenomena, the decision maker can then either select the ‘best’ model, or by producing an 
ensemble model, average all the model predictions, weighted by the performance of each. We can 
‘solve’ the BMCA problem using Bayes Theorem by replacing hypotheses with models, 𝑀 = 𝑚$, and 
evidence with data, 𝐷: 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚$	|	𝐷) = 𝑃(𝐷	|	𝑀 = 𝑚$)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚$)∑ 𝑃(𝐷	|	𝑀 = 𝑚$)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚$)2$34 	(2) 
where: 𝑃(𝐷	|	𝑀 = 𝑚$) is the likelihood of observing that data under model; 𝑀 = 𝑚$; and 𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚$) 
is the prior probability of the model being true. Assuming equal priors, those models with higher 
likelihood probabilities will have equivalently higher posterior probabilities. We can then select and 
use the most plausible model as being equal to the one with the highest posterior probability. 
Alternatively, we can average the resulting predictions for a given variable of interest, 𝜙, made by the 
ensemble of models: 
𝑃(𝜙	|	𝐷) =:𝑃(𝜙	|	𝑀 = 𝑚$, 𝐷)𝑃(𝑀 = 𝑚$	|	𝐷)2$34 	(3) 
where the posterior probability, 𝑃(𝜙	|	𝐷), is the average of the predictions sourced from each model 
and weighted by their performance using formula (2). 
A BN (also known as a graphical probabilistic model) is a Bayesian model that is composed of a 
graphical structure and a set of parameters. The graphical structure of a BN is a Directed Acyclic Graph 
(DAG). Each node of the DAG represents a random variable and each directed edge represents a relation 
between those variables. When one or more parent nodes are connected by a directed edge to a child 
node a set of probability assignments (the parameterization) is used to define their Conditional 
Probability Distribution (CPD). An example BN is the joint distribution 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷) =𝑃(𝐷	|	𝐶)𝑃(𝐵	|	𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶), shown by Figure 1. Bayes theorem can then be applied to the DAG to 
query any probability from the model (e.g. 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐶) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐷	|	𝐶)𝑃(𝐵	|	𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶)?,@ ). 
 
Figure 1 A simple 4 variable BN 
The DAG encodes conditional independence assertions between its variables. For example, a node is 
conditionally independent from the rest of the BN given that its parents, children and the parents of 
their children are observed (see [19] and [20] for more information on BNs and their conditional 
independence properties). The conditional independence assertions encoded in the DAG enables a BN 
to represent a complex joint probability distribution in a compact and factorized way. In some 
circumstances the DAG may be chosen to represent causal assertions connecting known and unknown 
events and the CPTs assigned may represent our subjective beliefs (probabilities) about these events. In 
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Figure 1 the factorization 𝑃(𝐷	|	𝐶)𝑃(𝐵	|	𝐴, 𝐶)𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐶) may therefore be considered as assertion that 
variables 𝐴, 𝐶 jointly cause variable 𝐵, while 𝐷 is a consequence of 𝐶 alone. 
BNs have established inference algorithms that make exact and approximate inference computations by 
exploiting the conditional independence encoded in the structure. Popular exact algorithms, such as the 
Junction Tree algorithm [20], and available in commercial and free software packages, [21], provide 
efficient solutions computations for BNs with only discrete variables. 
4. Our Framework 
Our framework is a direct application of BMCA, stylised to fit a legal context. We assume legal 
arguments are represented by BN models whose outputs, in the form of plausibility probabilities and 
assessments of guilt/innocence, are used by BMCA to compare and average. For simplicity we assume 
there are two sides to the case, each presenting a single defence and a prosecution argument, where each 
of these can be represented by a single BN model. Yet, in practice more arguments may be ‘in play’.  
Denoting the two BN models respectively by 𝑚A	and 𝑚@, we shall take the Bayesian point of view that 
the fact-finder's uncertainty about which model is correct is expressed by prior probabilities. Note that 
the prior distribution over models is not the same as a prior distribution of guilt/innocence. 
 
The two sides' arguments each specify a joint probability distribution of a whole list of further variables, 
conditional on a random variable 𝑀 taking the value either 𝑚A or 𝑚@. Two BN models for the defence 
and prosecution arguments are shown in Figure 2, for the example we will cover in detail in Section 5. 
 
The two lists of model variables can differ, but they do have some commonalities - after all, they are 
both models for the same case.  We will list those commonalities later, but first we make some remarks 
concerning notation. Here we adopt the notational convention that random variables are denoted by 
upper case letters, realised values of random variables are denoted with lower case letters. We take the 
Bayesian point of view that probabilities which depend on unknown parameters are just conditional 
probabilities. Hence, mathematically, unknown parameters are just unobserved values of random 
variables. We denote guilt by a Boolean variable 𝐺 (where 𝐺 = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 represent innocence); we take 
the collection of observed facts to be 𝐹 = 𝑓. Furthermore, we denote by 𝐶 the collection of expressions 
of credibility of each source of observed facts, 𝐹 = 𝑓, where each variable in 𝐶 is simply the belief in 
the accuracy of a source of evidence. We can differentiate credibility in the two models respectively as  𝐶 = 𝐶A and 𝐶 = 𝐶@. We can do the same for fact nodes such that we have 𝐹 = 𝐹A and 𝐹 = 𝐹@ because 
models may agree on some facts but not on others. Likewise, a fact variable may be agreed by both 
sides or presented by one side but unchallenged by the other, and hence have no associated credibility 
variable in one or both models (hence a credibility variable may not appear in one model but do so in 
another if its associated fact variables are ignored in one but not the other). 
 
Each model will include one or more hypothesis variables, 𝐻 = ℎ, representing unknowns (such as 
whether some event happened or not), that are causally associated with any observed facts providing 
evidence about the hypotheses. Each side will share at least one hypothesis – guilt, 𝐺, but will differ in 
the number and role of additional hypotheses nodes included in their model. Within our framework we 
therefore give special status to guilt, 𝐺, to differentiate between it and other hypothesis variables, 𝐻.  
However, despite their necessary role in each model unknown hypothesis variables play no prominent 
part in our framework and are therefore removed by marginalization. 
 
Both models must include variable 𝐺 and collections of variables 	𝐹, 𝐶 and ranging over the same 
possible values. But everything else can be different. Prosecution and defence agree on the facts, but 
they disagree on their meaning and interpretation in numerous ways: they have different understandings 
of how the facts are causally related to guilt/innocence, both qualitatively (DAGs) and quantitatively 
(CPTs); different hypothesis variables can be involved; and finally, they have different a priori 
positions concerning the reliability of different sources of evidence, but ultimately it is the fact-finder’s 
assessment of these that is pre-eminent. 
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Figure 2 Initial prosecution, 𝑚A, and defence models, 𝑚@ 
Marginalizing over the hypothesis nodes, the prosecution's Bayesian model determines a joint 
probability distribution of (𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶) conditional on 𝑀 = 𝑚A. Similarly, the defence's model determines 
a joint probability distribution of (𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶) conditional on 𝑀 = 𝑚@. Together with a prior distribution 
of M this gives us a joint probability distribution of (𝑀,𝐺, 𝐹, 𝐶).  
 
The prosecution believes that 𝐶 = 𝐶A and the defence believes that 𝐶 = 𝐶@. Each believes that their 
own model is correct, conditioned on the facts and the credibility of the sources of these facts. They 
then assert that the defendant is guilty or innocent, respectively, because: 
 
(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦	|	𝐹 = 𝑓, 𝐶 = 𝐶A,𝑀 = 𝑚A)	is large (4) 
(defence)  𝑃(𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦	|	𝐹 = 𝑓, 𝐶 = 𝐶@,𝑀 = 𝑚@) is small (5) 
 
The court hearings allow the fact-finder to get their own opinion as to the value of 𝐶. We suppose that 
this opinion is summarised by a definitive understanding that 𝐶 = 𝑐. We furthermore define model 
plausibility as the probability of observing the facts given model 𝑚 is true, the credibility of the sources 
of those facts, conditioned on the model conclusion made by each party (guilt or innocence): 
 
(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚A)	(6) 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚@)	(7) 
 
The model plausibility “belongs” to the fact-finder - the party who must make assessments of the 
likelihood that 𝐹 = 𝑓. 
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From now on we will abuse notation in the conventional way by rewriting model plausibility as: 
 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔,𝑀 = 𝑚) = 𝑝T|U,V(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚)	(8) 
Using the definition of conditional probability, we obtain the following result2: 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)∑ 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚X)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚X)𝑝(𝑚X)YZ 	(9) 
Which shows how model plausibility, 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓), impacts on our posterior belief in which model is 
true, 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓). Moreover, model plausibility also enters our posterior belief in guilt or innocence 
(writing 𝑔  for the value ‘guilty’ of the variable 𝐺), resulting in the theorem: 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚)𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓)Y ∑ 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓)Y = ∑ 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)Y ∑ 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)Y (10)	 
Essentially, the court proceedings might well give the fact-finder more insights into the two models. 
Can the assumed causal structures be taken seriously, along with all their hidden variables; are the 
accompanying causal relations acceptable? It seems to us that the court proceedings could lead the fact-
finder to wish to adjust the two models or to re-evaluate the prior over the two models. More seriously 
still, the fact-finder might conclude that, even after such modifications, neither model can be accepted. 
If the two possibilities are not exhaustive, then a probability of guilt given that just one of the two is 
true could be terribly misleading; we will return to this issue later in Section 5. Also, note that the prior 
distribution over the two models is not the same as the prior probability of guilt or innocence. It is rather 
some kind of meta-prior: the subjective prior probability that one or the other of two whole complexes 
of arguments is correct. That makes it all the harder to evaluate, and more likely that further analysis 
could reveal large inadequacies of both models. Significant differences between assumptions about 
causal structure could make clear that different aspects of both models must be rejected. The scientific 
method tells us to reject models which make false predictions, but it does not tell us how to amend the 
models when that happens, and Bayesian methodology is not much help here. These and other open 
questions are revisited at the end of the paper. 
Our framework makes use of the evidence accuracy idiom described in [4], which represents how a 
fact-finder reasons about evidence reliant on the credibility of a source providing that evidence. It is 
implemented as a BN to distinguish between the truth of a hypothesis (such as whether some event 
happened or not) and the source (such as a witness) that provides evidence about the hypothesis (which 
could be direct, such as asserting that the hypothesis is true, or indirect such as making an assertion 
which supports the hypothesis). Figure 3 presents the basic BN form of this idiom. 
 
Figure 3 Model showing evidence accuracy idiom 
The extent to which the fact-finder can infer the truth of the hypothesis from the source assertion 
obviously depends on the source credibility. If the source is credible then their evidence will increase 
                                               
2 For simplicity we use a simple conditioning here, but each model might be represented by different conditioning 
assumptions. Likewise, to simplify the presentation we have also dropped other variables, such as those 
representing unknown hypotheses, which are marginalized out in any case. 
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the fact-finder’s belief in the hypothesis being true; if the source is discredited, then their testimony will 
have little or no impact on the fact-finder’s belief in the hypothesis. In practice, the evidence about 
source credibility might take the form of oral contradictions, obfuscations, untruths or physical or 
emotional displays that are taken to betray the credibility of the source; or impeccable credentials and 
cogent reasoning that make them believable. Evidence about source credibility generally does not fix 
the values of source credibility nodes. Such evidence (together with the facts 𝐹 = 𝑓) only update the 
prior distributions over their values within each of the prosecution and defence models. This is the sense 
in which the two sets of variables may be collapsed together; however, it usually will not allow us to 
instantiate 𝐶 (with certainty) for both models simultaneously. We can simply consider evidence about 
source credibility as “just another kind of evidence”, i.e., we add it to the facts 𝐹. The credibility 
variables 𝐶 become “hidden variables”. We just have two models for the joint distribution of 𝐹 and 𝐺, 
and a prior over the models; both models include many “hidden variables”, including the credibility 
sources. They are used to express the causal relations between what is observed. We compute the 
posterior probabilities of the models, and the posterior probability of guilt, using even simpler versions 
of the earlier formulas, for instance: 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)Y ∑ 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑚)𝑝(𝑚)Y 	(11)	 
What has become more complex is that 𝑓 now stands for the combination of evidence obtained prior to 
the trial and evidence obtained during the trial. If one is interested, one can look at posterior probabilities 
of source credibility given the evidence 𝑓. This makes sense given both prosecution and defence models 
contain the same source credibility nodes in the sense that the probabilities 𝑃(𝐶 = 𝑐	|	𝑀 = 𝑚$)	are well 
defined in each model 𝑚. Indeed, given it is the fact-finder who is judging credibility then it should be 
the same in each model. If the evidence 𝑓 consists of two parts (𝑓4, 𝑓]), one can also use the same 
formula iteratively, first updating the prior using the information (𝐹4 = 𝑓4), and then updating the 
“intermediate posterior” using the information (𝐹] = 𝑓]), representing further evidence of a secondary 
nature coming to light during the case, which we call source credibility evidence. This is, of course, 
equivalent to using the earlier formula 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓), where the two steps are combined into one. 
The defence model might only deal with a subset of the facts. The same can be true for the prosecution. 
Nor are either side required to challenge the credibility of sources by cross examination. In Bayesian 
terms this means that a model 𝑚 is a model for some part 𝐹Y = 𝑓Y of the facts. We can write ?^?Y for 
the remaining facts, the overline standing for “complement”. In this circumstance some variables in a 
model will be causally disconnected from those others playing a full role in the legal argument. But the 
defence or prosecution may not just be ignoring ?^?Y = 𝑓Y̅, they may claim irrelevance, which in strict 
Bayesian terms translates into conditional independence: the defence model might claim independence 
of the event part ?^?Y = 𝑓Y̅ given innocence and given 𝐹Y = 𝑓Y. The problem is that defining a position 
on the value of the conditional probabilities for these “ignored facts” is difficult if they are irrelevant.  
As we saw from (7), we do need the values of 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑚) for both models 𝑚, where 𝑓 = (𝑓Y, 𝑓Y̅) is the 
combination of all facts, so we cannot simply drop facts from one model but keep them in the other. 
One solution is to allow the fact-finder to consider the relevance of an ignored fact to a model, either 
by adjusting the prior belief in the model or by assigning a probability distribution to each ignored fact. 
If judged genuinely irrelevant, a non-informative distribution might be assigned to each ignored fact, 
resulting in 𝑝`𝑓Y̅	a	𝑚) equaling one half to the power of the number of ignored facts nodes, the 
dimension of 𝐹Y. That way, ignoring more facts becomes more heavily penalised. This has the side 
effect of allowing us to compute the probability of a model making a random guess of the facts, thus 
providing a baseline. On the other hand, some facts may be ignored for legitimate reasons, and thus 
may be assigned higher or lower probability, conditional on background knowledge. In these ways 
ignored facts play a crucial role in our framework. 
In law, the defence is not obliged to come up with a complete scenario dealing thoroughly with all facts 
brought to the case. As we have said the defence's position might well be that the accused is innocent, 
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and certain facts are simply quite irrelevant. Therefore, the fact-finder should be allowed flexibility to 
deal with what we call “silent facts”. Silent facts may represent a deliberate strategy to avoid self-
incrimination, or, alternatively, where the defendant simply has not had access to the resources or time 
needed to muster a credible counter argument to explain these facts. Likewise, there may be suspicion 
that the prosecution might be suppressing evidence to help secure a conviction. These reasons serve to 
“explain away” ignored facts in a model which, although they may be missing from the argument made, 
are nevertheless very informative. We suggest handling this by allowing the fact-finder to construct 
explanations for ignored facts that reflect their beliefs about the reasons for silence i.e. they explain 
them away by extending the causal model. 
Of course, during a court case, or indeed during the process of investigation, arguments do not remain 
static. They change as defence and prosecution react to new evidence. At its most basic we can consider 
two kinds of narratives: the story of the crime (and its investigation) and the story of the court case [22], 
[23]. In one we have causal conjectures about what happened and in the other we deal with causal 
conjectures that seek to undermine or support the first. In the latter the timing of the presentation of 
evidence, as well as the type and strength of evidence, can be crucial in testing the causal narrative 
about the crime. For instance, an advocate may keep some information back for cross examination in 
order to unbalance a witness or they may call a witness who presents ‘surprising’ testimony that may 
overturn the opposing case [24]. Similarly, at various stages in the legal process one party may be privy 
to information not available to the other. This information asymmetry is rightly considered unfair in 
most legal jurisdictions and in such cases all information must be disclosed to all parties. Interestingly, 
this unfairness property is mimicked in Bayes’ because we cannot carry out Bayesian model comparison 
if the models are being compared against different data. So, in this way Bayes theorem enforces the 
legal requirement of fairness. It is our intention that our framework be flexible enough to deal with 
dynamic shifts in the case and asymmetry. 
In our framework some probabilities are provided by the fact-finder, as inputs, and some are computed, 
as outputs, either manually using the mathematics of probability theory or automatically using Bayesian 
Network software such as [21]. Thus in (9) the fact finder estimates the probabilities 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚), 𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚) and 𝑝(𝑚) and these are then used as inputs, via software or manually, to compute 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) and 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓). 
As a final word it should be clear that, in practice, each legal argument will be constructed independently 
and with different objectives in mind, and so there is no guarantee that the variables and states specified 
in one are identical or consistent with those presented in another. An example where this is obvious 
occurs when a prosecutor may define the variable for guilt, 𝐺, as having mutually exclusive states {𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, ¬𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟} whilst the defence might specify the variable innocent, 𝐼, with mutually exclusive 
states {𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒,𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟}. Here ¬𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 includes the possibility of an accident, a state that cannot 
even be recognised in the defence model since this model admits only two events and neither of which 
includes accident. Therefore, whilst it cannot be practically guaranteed that variable definitions are 
uniform and standardized across arguments, we assume that the fact-finder is able to impose some 
uniformity at least for the purposes of applying this framework. 
5. Applying the framework to an example 
To illustrate the framework, consider the following hypothetical case:  
A victim is known to have been murdered. A defendant is accused of the murder. The 
prosecution argument is based on these facts  
• the defendant previously threatened to kill the victim, and this was witnessed 
• an eyewitness who claims to have been at the crime scene and asserts to having seen 
the defendant kill the victim  
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• a forensic expert witness asserts that DNA collected from the crime scene matches that 
of the defendant.  
While the defence is silent on the fact that the defendant previously threatened the victim and 
has no comment on the eyewitness statement, their argument is based on the claim that the 
defendant was not at the scene of the crime at the time – a claim supported by the defendant’s 
partner who asserts that she was in a cinema with him at the time of the crime. Also, the defence 
claim that the victim and the defendant were friends (and hence there was no motive) 
These initial arguments may be those represented in the prosecution and defence opening statements. 
The BN models representing the fact-finder’s understanding of these prosecution and defence 
arguments is shown in Figure 2, along with a legend showing the different types of nodes used. The 
CPTs for the example are listed in the Appendix; note that this includes the prior values for the 
credibility nodes which are never instantiated directly with evidence. 
The facts, 𝑓, of the prosecution model, 𝑚A, are: 
• “Forensic witness asserts DNA collected from scene” = True 
• “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True 
• “Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim” = True 
• “Witness claims that defendant previously threatened them” = True 
The facts, 𝑓, the defence model, 𝑚@ , are:  
• “Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema” = True  
• “Witness claims that defendant friends with victim” = True. 
Notice that the defence makes no attempt to explain several facts that support the prosecution model. 
Also, the prosecution does not include the two defence facts. Hence, both models (implicitly) contain 
ignored facts. These are ignored facts in our framework. Also, notice that the fact “Defendant friends 
with victim” = True does not have an associated credibility source variable. This is because this fact is 
introduced in the defence argument but never addressed nor challenged by the prosecution, hence any 
judgement about source credibility is unnecessary in either model. 
Let’s assume the fact-finder decides to weigh the models according to how well they explain the facts 
of the case, giving higher weight to the prosecution model: 𝑝(𝑚A) = 0.8, 𝑝(𝑚@) = 0.2. Let’s also 
assume that the fact-finder assigns their own prior beliefs in the source credibility variables,	𝐶 = 𝑐 , as 
given in the Appendix. 
The facts observed, 𝑓, update the fact-finder’s source credibility variables to provide new posterior 
beliefs that then affect the inference of 𝐺 in each model. By executing the models we compute the 
marginal probability of guilt directly from the guilt node, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦	(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒), named: “Defendant 
killed the victim”, conditioned on the facts: 𝑝(𝑔	|𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚A) = 	0.999, 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚@) = 	0.0014. As 
expected, the fact-finder’s perceives that the prosecution argument is very certain of guilt and the 
defence argument is convinced of innocence. 
Under our framework we first measure the plausibility the fact-finder should have in each model. This 
is the joint probability of all facts given the model, assuming guilt or innocence respectively. For the 
prosecution the plausibility is the probability of the joint event: {“Forensic witness asserts DNA 
collected from scene” = True, “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True, “Eye 
witness says they saw defendant attack victim” = True, “Defendant previously threatened witness” = 
True, “Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema” = True, “Defendant friends with victim” = 
True} conditioned on 	𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦. For the defence it is the same joint event conditioned on , 𝐺 =¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦. Here we assume the fact-finder is happy to assign non-informative distributions to the ignored 
facts. Putting these observations into our model and equations (6) and (7) gives us: 
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(prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚A) = 0.330 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚@) = 0.050 
Therefore, the probability of the prosecution argument explaining the facts is 0.33 and for the defence 
is 0.05. A random assignment of truth values to the facts would yield 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓) = 1 2⁄ i = 0.015625, 
so the prosecution model is significantly better than a guess, but the defence model less so. The 
plausibility of the defence model is low because of the number of ignored facts in the model: had more 
facts been explained the plausibility would have been higher. 
We now put the model priors and the plausibility probabilities into Equation (6), yielding these posterior 
beliefs in each model:  𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A) + 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@)= 	 0.330(0.8)0.050(0.2) + 0.330(0.8) = 0.964	 𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A) + 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@)= 	 0.050(0.2)0.050(0.2) + 0.330(0.8) = 0.036 
So, at the opening of the trial the fact-finder already believes the prosecution model is better at 
explaining the facts of the case. Next, we need to calculate the probability of guilt given the two models, 
using equation (10): 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚)𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑓)Y ∑ 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑓)Y = 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑓)𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑓)= 0.0367(0.0014) + 0.964(0.999)0.0367 + 0.964 = 0.962 
For the fact-finder, the probability of guilt is 0.962 based on their plausibility in the two models, the 
credibility of the sources of evidence, the facts presented, and the causal and probabilistic assumptions 
made in each model. 
Our framework has successfully combined two models with different assumptions and produced a 
single assessment, belonging to the fact-finder, in a way that gives greater weight to the model that 
explains the facts better. Of course, we also wish to model the dynamic nature of an evolving case, 
especially using new facts gained during the cross-examination process. As a last step let’s now assume 
that a cross examination has taken place and new supplementary facts have been discovered: 
The defendant is much more likely to have left DNA at the scene than the prosecution assumes 
because the defendant was a frequent visitor to the scene of the crime in a way that is consistent 
with the DNA findings. 
During the defence witness cross examination, she claims her partner would have shown up on 
the cinema’s CCTV system. It turns out the police had collected the CCTV video but not made 
it available to the defence. Subsequently it was made available to the court, and despite not 
being of high quality, the fact-finder believed it showed someone matching the accused 
description at the cinema at the time of the crime. 
It is revealed by the eye witness that she failed to pick out the defendant on an identity parade 
Finally, under cross examination the character witness admitted to being in a rival gang. 
The new source credibility evidence (facts), 𝑓],	to add to the initial facts in the models, 𝑓4, are: 
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• “CCTV from camera corroborates description” = True 
•  “Identity parade failure” = True 
• “Character witness in rival gang” = True 
These new facts lead to newly revised models as shown in Figure 43. In the defence model the facts 
from the forensic witness do not imply guilt and the CPT for the variable “Defendant left DNA at the 
scene” assumes it is just as likely to be DNA at the scene if the defendant murdered the victim or not.  
Crucially, two facts are now no longer ignored in the defence model: “Forensic witness asserts DNA 
collected from scene” = True and “Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant” = True. 
Likewise, in the prosecution model the evidence “CCTV from camera corroborates description” = True 
is judged by the fact-finder to be so remote, within the context of the prosecution scenario, that it is 
assigned a probability value of 0.001: perhaps not unreasonable, given the evidence was supressed. 
 
 
Figure 4 Revised prosecution, 𝑚A, and defence models, 𝑚@ 
                                               
3 Note that Figure 4 shows two separate BN models, but the underlying computation uses one model. This is 
because we need to ensure the probabilities computed for the source credibility variables are identical and 
consistent in each model. So, during computation we combine credibility variables to enable us to produce a single 
model containing two sub-models linked to a single common collection of credibility nodes belonging to the fact-
finder. This does not mean to say that each model contains the same credibility variables; in Figure 4 “Partner 
credibility” is linked to variables in the defence model only. 
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In both models, the probability of guilt, conditioned on the facts and fact-finder’s beliefs about source 
credibility, has not changed significantly: 𝑝(𝑔	|𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚A) = 	0.96362, 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚@) = 	0.000271. 
We can now update the relevant probabilities for equation (6) and (7) to give: 
 (prosecution)  𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚A) = 0.00001 
(defence) 𝑃(𝐹 = 𝑓	|	𝐶 = 𝑐, 𝐺 = ¬𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦,𝑀 = 𝑚@) = 0.091 
We can now see that the fact-finder’s plausibility in the prosecution model has collapsed from 0.33 to 
0.00001. Their plausibility in the defence model has increased by a factor of two, from 0.05 to 0.091. 
Equations (9) and (10) now give: 𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A) + 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑐, 𝑔	|	𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@)= 	 0.00001(0.8)0.091(0.2) + 0.00001(0.8) = 4.38𝐸 − 5 𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@)𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A) + 𝑝(𝑓	|	𝑐, 𝑔,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@) = 	 0.091(0.2)0.091(0.2) + 0.00001(0.8)= 0.999956 
Thus, the posterior belief in the defence model has risen dramatically from 0.036 to 0.999956 and the 
posterior belief in the prosecution model has decreased to 4.38𝐸 − 5	from 0.964. 
Also, the probability of guilt for the defence model has changed slightly to 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑚@) = 	0.0027 
given the new causal structure in the model. The new probability of guilt using equation (10) is: 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓) = ∑ 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚)𝑝(𝑚	|𝑓)Y ∑ 𝑝(𝑚	|	𝑓)Y = 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚@)𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓,𝑚A)𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑓)𝑝(𝑚@	|	𝑓) + 𝑝(𝑚A	|	𝑓)= 0.000271	(0.999956) + 0.96362(4.38𝐸 − 5)0.999956 + 4.38𝐸 − 5 = 0.000313 
So, by now explaining the DNA facts and providing damning evidence that cannot be explained by the 
prosecution, the fact-finder’s revised conclusion would dramatically change from 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓) = 0.962 to 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑓) = 0.000313. Note this would be a change in the fact-finder’s belief rather than that of the 
advocates. 
6. Comparison with an integrated Bayesian model 
Here we present a Bayesian integrated model developed from our example, using all the information 
available to the fact-finder up to and including the final step in our example. This integrated model is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Combining the prosecution and defence arguments requires the fact-finder to merge the models using 
established methods [4], [6]. Bayesian model integration involves the production of a single model 
including all relevant variables (hypotheses, facts and credibility sources etc) associated with the 
defence and prosecution positions.  By seeking to unify disparate arguments in a single integrated model 
encounters modelling difficulties that are hard to overcome, such as those reported in [9] relating to the 
basic requirement of mutual exclusivity, and the requirement that conditional or causal dependencies 
remain consistent despite competing or contradictory argument narratives. Likewise, the integrated 
approach assumes an omniscient fact-finder capable of rationally fusing all relevant information. Whilst 
the integrated approach represents a noble ideal for determining the ‘true’ state of the world, each party 
in a trial process may present more than one argument, each mutually exclusive of the other, positing 
different causal conjectures, assigning different weights to evidence or even ignoring some kinds of 
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evidence or elements of the argument altogether. This last strategy – ignoring some kinds of evidence 
or argument altogether – does of course reflect a real choice open to the fact-finder and one that has the 
benefit of simplicity but obviously at the expense of discarding information that the fact finder either 
doesn’t agree with or cannot easily reconcile.  
Given that some irresolvable differences may not be easy to ignore then the way to handle these during 
Bayesian integration is to explicitly model them. This can be done by conditioning subsets of the 
integrated model representing these irrevocable differences on new scenario variables, representing 
these differences as uncertain variables. These scenario variables are in turn themselves conditioned on 
a model variable which directly represents the fact-finder’s prior belief in each model. In this way 
scenario and model variables are interwoven into the BN to connect facts, hypotheses and credibility 
sources together with the different variables and dependencies associated with the defence and 
prosecution arguments. This strategy is investigated in [11], [25] but without emphasis on model 
integration. 
In our example three distinct irresolvable differences, or contradictions, arise from the models that are 
important, and it is worth focusing on how these are handled by an integrated model: 
• The defence argument makes distinctly different assumptions about the prior motive of the 
defendant from that made by the prosecution. 
• The assumptions made about the hypothesis variable “DNA left at the scene” differ 
• The treatment of ‘ignored facts’ differs in each model 
These differences are reflected in the different CPT tables in each model, as listed in the Appendix.  
They therefore have an impact on the structure of the integrated model – the integrated model now must 
accommodate distinct and mutually exclusive sets of assumptions and these are defence or prosecution 
model dependant. This dependency is represented by explicitly including several conditioning scenario 
variables that act as “switches” to switch prosecution or defence scenarios on or off. In Figure 5 these 
scenario variables are shown as the rectangular nodes “Model scene assumption”, to represent different 
assumptions about the past frequency of the defendant visiting the scene, and “Model motive 
assumption”, to represent different assumptions for motive. The third issue relating to how ‘ignored 
facts’ are treated also has a significant structural effect on the model, because, again, for each argument 
the CPTs and conditioning changes. This is accommodated by the scenario variables “Model ignored 
facts” in the integrated model.  Each of these scenario switch variables is then ultimately conditionally 
dependent on a “Models” variable with mutually exclusive states 𝑀 = {𝑚A,𝑚@} (this node replaces 
the “meta prior” used in our framework). 
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Figure 5 Integrated Bayesian model (model and scenario variables are shown as rectangles) 
Obviously, armed with the integrated model we can answer how likely the facts are given the model, 
and we can infer the belief in the model given the facts and the belief in guilt. Assuming the same prior 
as before, 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚A) = 0.8, 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚@) = 0.2, from the integrated model this is simply calculated 
to give: 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚A	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 	0.002397 𝑝(𝑀 = 𝑚@	|	𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑓) = 0.997603 
With the result for 𝐺 = 𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦: 𝑝(𝑔	|	𝑐, 𝑓,𝑀) = 0.002849 
This result looks directly close and comparable to the result calculated using our framework, giving us 
some comfort that by using different frameworks we can reach similar conclusions. 
However, we have argued that it is worthwhile to keep models separate for several reasons: our 
framework can tolerate differences in causal structure, disagreements of parameterisation and also a 
difference in the prior beliefs in the arguments. In contrast, from this integrationist example we can see 
that whilst integration can be enabled using scenario nodes (thus treating a single model as a mixture 
of different models) this comes at a cost in model legibility and malleability. Also, we would need to 
add scenario nodes for differences in causal structure and it is a considerable challenge to do this, 
especially so as the model grows in size and the accompanying potentiality for contradiction. 
7. Discussion 
The framework we have described assumes that exactly one of the two models put forward by 
prosecution and defence is true. However, in criminal law this may be unrealistic as the fact-finder may 
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come to entertain other pictures of how the world works beyond those initially put forward by defence 
and prosecution. The fact-finder may arrive at their own picture of how facts in the case are related, and 
it may well combine some elements of both parties’ explanations of the facts, and at the same time 
reject other elements of both parties’ explanations. In other words: the fact-finder is free to come up 
with an integrated model which, in effect, contradicts both models initially brought to the court by the 
two parties. In some legal jurisdictions this ‘freewheeling’ approach may present a problem in that the 
fact-finder may arrive at conclusions independently of the evidence, arguments and cross examinations 
related to the case. Indeed, given the way the jury system operates in Anglo-Saxon countries this can 
and does occur. 
A second weakness is that the approach gives little guidance on how to choose the prior distribution 
over the two models. Because the approach is an unashamed subjective Bayesian approach, the initial 
probabilities of the two models are subjective or personal probabilities. They are the personal 
probabilities of the fact-finder. They represent the fact-finder’s prior beliefs about the integrity and 
coherence of the arguments which have been presented by the two parties: they “reflect judgements the 
fact-finder might make about the global rationality of the argument”.  Crucially, they do not represent 
the fact-finder’s prior beliefs in guilt or innocence. However, more than just global rationality needs to 
be evaluated. How is a fact-finder to quantify their prior relative degree of plausibility in the two 
pictures of the world provided by the two parties in the case? These two pictures are actually very 
detailed; they consist of more than just an attempt to express rational knowledge about what depends 
on what in graphical form. They also entail strengths of dependence in precise quantitative form. An 
outline sketch is transformed into an oil-painting. Also, any remaining uncertainties are quantified and 
expressed in terms of probability distributions representing, hopefully, rational degrees of belief 
in different possible values. 
Moreover, trial proceedings could well lead to dissatisfaction with both models, even if the prosecution 
model was significantly more plausible than the defence model. This makes computation of posterior 
probabilities conditional on just one of the two quite meaningless. In our framework we allow the fact-
finder to revise the prior distribution of the two models, as well as their parameters, but there is not a 
formal (Bayesian or other) way to do this. If the fact-finder truly is trying to identify the true facts of 
the matter, flexibility and creativity is required. Even if the fact-finder is merely an adjudicator between 
two fixed points of view, Bayesian thinking cannot tell the fact-finder how to weigh two “wrong 
arguments”.  It seems to us that many miscarriages of justice, both in jurisdictions in the adversarial 
tradition and those in the inquisitorial tradition, have been caused by uncritical acceptance of badly 
flawed models, even when the defects of those models were explicitly brought to the attention of the 
court. Subjective confidence in expert evidence can easily depend more on the showmanship of the 
expert and the simplicity of the expert's message, than on the actual content of the expert's evidence. 
Similarly, the subjective prior probability of a model could be influenced by the model's simplicity even 
though it contains logical inconsistencies. We hope our framework might help in analysing such cases. 
We recommend our approach as a basis for investigating issues in the comparison of incomparable 
Bayesian models of legal incompatible arguments; this is, in essence, the problem facing a fact-finder 
in a criminal case. We do not claim to provide a fool-proof solution. No one does. In the inquisitorial 
approach the fact-finder is a truth seeker and may creatively generate new models. In the adversarial 
approach the fact-finder is a referee and is under no obligation to generate new models. One option 
would be to extend our framework to add a third model, a kind of default model, where the fact-finder 
should allocate some prior probability to a model in which the accused is “not proven guilty or innocent" 
(the Scottish model whereby jurors in Scotland can return one of three verdicts: one of conviction, 
“guilty”, and two of acquittal, “not proven” and “not guilty” ). Inconsistencies in the prosecution and 
defence models could lead to an increase in the prior probability of this third model. Court hearings can 
reveal inconsistencies in the argument of the prosecution so large, that the prior probability of the default 
innocence model should increase. Whether or not the defence arguments are reasonable should then 
become irrelevant. The third, default model, takes over. The subjective Bayesian prior over the models 
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could then only be decided after the court proceedings, not in advance; especially if we allow the parties 
to modify their models as the trial proceeds. 
Clearly what we have proposed is a theoretical framework; while the working example we provided 
demonstrates that it can be applied in a non-trivial case, we accept that this is very far from being any 
kind of serious validation of its practicality or usefulness. We hope that such validation will be the 
subject of future research. 
8. Conclusions 
In previous approaches Bayesian models of legal arguments have been developed with the aim of 
producing a single integrated model, combining each of the legal arguments under consideration. This 
combined approach implicitly assumes that variables and their relationships can be represented without 
any contradiction or misalignment and in a way that makes sense with respect to the competing 
argument narratives. Rather than aim to integrate arguments into a single model, this paper has 
described a novel approach to compare and ‘average’ Bayesian models of legal arguments that have 
been built independently and with no attempt to make them consistent in terms of variables, causal 
assumptions or parameterization. 
In our framework competing models of legal arguments are assessed by the extent to which the facts 
reported are confirmed or disconfirmed in court, as judged by the fact-finder. Those models that are 
more heavily disconfirmed are assigned lower weights, as model plausibility measures, in the Bayesian 
model comparison and averaging approach adopted. We have presented a simple example to describe 
the ideas and method and contrasted it with an equivalent integrated Bayesian model. 
We believe that our framework approach borrows strengths from the Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
narrative approaches to legal argumentation without introducing any new significant weaknesses. We 
would suggest that our approach might be more consistent with legal practice, where plurality in 
arguments is crucial, yet it does so in a novel way that views elements of the legal process as one 
consistent with empirical scientific methodology. 
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Appendix 
 
CPTs for Prosecution BN model at initial stage 
Defendant had motive, Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema (ignored fact), Defendant 
friends with victim (ignored fact) 
 
Character witness credibility, Eye witness credibility, Forensic witness credibility 
 
Defendant previously threatened witness | Character witness credibility, Defendant had motive 
  
Defendant killed the victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim | Defendant killed the victim, Eye witness credibility 
 
Defendant left DNA at scene | Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA was collected from scene | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
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CPTs for Defence BN model at initial stage 
Defendant had motive 
 
Defendant friends with victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Partner credibility 
 
Defendant killed the victim | Defendant had motive 
 
Defendant partner says he was with her in cinema | Partner credibility, Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant (ignored fact), Forensic witness asserts DNA 
was collected from scene (ignored fact), Eye witness says they saw defendant attack victim (ignored 
fact), Defendant previously threatened witness (ignored fact) 
 
New CPTs for Prosecution BN model at revision stage 
CCTV from cinema corroborates description (ignored fact) 
 
Character witness in rival gang | Character witness credibility 
 
Identity parade fail | Eye witness credibility 
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New CPTs for Defence BN model at revision stage 
Character witness in rival gang | Character witness credibility 
 
Identity parade fail | Eye witness credibility 
 
CCTV from cinema corroborates description | Partner credibility 
 
Defendant left DNA at scene | Defendant killed the victim 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA tested was from defendant | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
Forensic witness asserts DNA was collected from scene | Forensic witness credibility, Defendant left 
DNA at scene 
 
 
